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BRIDGING THE FEDERALISM GAP:
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND




What does the current federalism mean for poor and low-
income people of color? Recent Supreme Court decisions limit the
power of the federal government to legislate and the federal courts
to provide redress, particularly in the area of civil rights. For
example, the Court has invalidated federal legislation allowing
individuals to seek monetary damages from states for employment
discrimination based on age' and disability, 2 and from private
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Lawyering
Program. I would like to thank Martha Davis, Matthew Diller, Nancy Morawetz,
Randall Jeffrey, Juan Cartagena, and Daniel Belasco for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to the Skadden Fellowship Foundation for
its continued generous support, including its support of this project.
1. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2001) (invalidating private right of
action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
2. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating private
suits for money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
The Court made clear, however, that Title I of the ADA is enforceable against the states
in suits for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or her official
capacity, under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
See also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (allowing private suits for money
damages under Title II of the ADA, so much as it requires states to provide a reasonable
accommodation to allow individuals access to the courts).
The Court stopped short of invalidating the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). In Hibbs, the Court relied
heavily on evidence that Congress was responding to evidence of state discrimination in
finding that Congress validly enacted the FMLA to safeguard the right to be free from
gender discrimination in the workplace, based on the significant impact and reinforcing
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individuals for gender-motivated violence. 3 In addition, the Court
has prohibited private lawsuits challenging race discrimination by
recipients of federal funding under a disparate impact theory.4
While these decisions impact the enforcement of federal rights
generally, they may pose special difficulties for people who are poor
and low-income, who in many instances must rely upon the
government for subsistence benefits, yet have little political, social
or financial power to protect their interests.
This impact is compounded by devolution. As the Court limits
the ability of individuals to bring states (and, in some cases, local
governments) into federal court, Congress is devolving significant
power to states and localities to create and implement poverty-
related programs. Through block grants, Congress is deregulating a
significant portion of the safety net and giving states and localities
more flexibility and discretion over social welfare programs.5 This
discretion and authority, when further devolved to local workers
and administrators, can be tainted with racial bias, raising the risk of
and resulting in a disparate impact on people of color.6 As a result,
individuals may face a greater risk of race discrimination within the
welfare system, with fewer statutory protections available to
challenge such discrimination. With limited federal constitutional
nature of gender stereotypes. Id. at 728-34.
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (invalidating civil
damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981,
based on the theory that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to
regulate private conduct). Morrison also limited Congress' authority to enact legislation
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, holding that Congress may not regulate non-
economic acts based on a cumulative impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 617-19. This
ruling relied heavily on the Court's previous decision in United States v. Lopez, in which
the Court held that Congress was not authorized under the Commerce Clause to enact
the Gun Free Zones Act of 1990, as it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the [gun] possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce." 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). For a discussion of the federalism implications of
the Morrison ruling, see Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of
Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000).
4. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that § 602 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act contains no private right of action to challenge race discrimination
under a disparate impact theory). The Court's ruling in Alexander, discussed more fully
in Section II, infra, in fact has implications beyond the ability of individuals to bring suit
against states, as it precludes disparate impact discrimination suits under Title VI
against all public and private recipients of federal funds.
5. Significantly, the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996,
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-08 (1996), replaced the former federal entitlement program with a block
grant welfare program whereby the states have broad flexibility and discretion to design
and implement their own welfare programs and further devolve authorities to localities.
The block grant program is discussed more fully in Section 1, infra.
6. See infra Section III(B)(2)(b).
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protections against class 7 and race discrimination,8 poor and low-
income people, especially poor and low-income people of color,
thus may become caught in the federalism gap.
This article explores whether, in this context, procedural due
process protections, which historically have been used to protect
against the unfair administration of government benefits, may
7. Courts review classifications based on wealth under a deferential "rational
basis" standard. The touchstone of the Court's treatment of poverty issues under the
Equal Protection Clause is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In that case,
plaintiffs challenged Maryland's Family Cap provision, which placed a ceiling on the
amount of welfare benefits that a family could receive, regardless of its size. In
upholding the family cap under an Equal Protection analysis, the Court stated:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematic nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
The Court has consistently applied this rational basis review when analyzing other
social welfare legislation. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 (1990) (applying
rational basis review to statutory interpretations that exclude child health insurance
from the definition of child support for purposes of determining a family's eligibility for
public assistance); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 598-01 (1987) (upholding statute
authorizing public assistance eligibility determinations to take into account the income
of all parents and siblings living in the same household on grounds that such a statute
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it" (quoting McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)));
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) ("[s]o long as its judgments are rational,
and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the
needy are not subject to a constitutional straightjacket"). See also San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("at least where wealth is involved, the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages"). The Court has never granted poverty "suspect class" status, and it has
never established a fundamental right to subsistence benefits. For a recounting of the
effort to establish a federal constitutional right to subsistence benefits, see MARTHA F.
DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, 56-
145 (1993).
Thus, the Court will not apply heightened scrutiny to Equal Protection challenges
involving the rights of the poor unless a fundamental right or recognized suspect
classification is implicated. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (applying
heightened scrutiny to a state policy of paying lower welfare benefits to new residents
during their first year in the state because it burdened the fundamental right to travel);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (applying heightened scrutiny to Social Security
Act's provision of benefits to dependent children of unemployed fathers but not to those
of unemployed mothers because of discrimination on the basis of sex).
8. Equal Protection challenges based on race discrimination must meet a
demanding and often unrealistic burden of proof of intentional discrimination. See, e.g.,
Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 548; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1979); infra notes 26-40
and accompanying text. Likewise, proof of sex discrimination must meet the
demanding intent standard. Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
For a critique of the intent standard, see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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provide a shield against discretionary actions resulting in a
disparate impact on people of color. A growing body of scholarship
examines the continuing viability and importance of procedural due
process protections for the poor. 9 This article explores how, in the
absence of strong statutory protections, such constitutional
protections may be utilized to stem race discrimination within a
devolved welfare system, thus bridging the federalism gap.
Section One of this article discusses how the devolution of
social welfare programs (through block granting) results in fewer
federal protections and uniformity and more state and local
discretion over poverty programs. This section examines the effect
of devolution on poor and low-income people of color who often
find themselves in contact with government entities and actors, thus
subject to state and local discretion and, potentially, racial bias.
Section Two examines how the Court's holding in Alexander v.
Sandoval'O-that individual litigants have no private right of action to
enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act"-in combination with devolution in the welfare context,
affect the ability of poor and low-income people of color to protect
their rights in federal court.
Section Three suggests that in this context, procedural due
process protections may provide an effective tool to curb race
discrimination in the welfare system.12 This section explores a
procedural due process argument whereby plaintiffs challenge
standardless, discretionary decision making by welfare caseworkers
by showing that a lack of appropriate procedures has an adverse
disparate impact on poor people of color, and that certain
procedural safeguards would ameliorate the problem. The article
concludes by suggesting that stemming race discrimination in the
9. See, e.g., Christine Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 89 (2002); Cynthia R. Farina, Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform:"
Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 619-21 (1998); Randal S.
Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare Reform: Client Stories from
New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123 (2002); Rebecca Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process:
Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9 (1997).
10. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1 (2005).
12. Other protections that may alleviate federalism's impact on the poor, including
state constitutional protections and international human rights protections, are outside
the scope of this article. For a discussion of the utility of using state constitutions to
protect the poor in the era of increased federalism, see, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Welfare
Devolution and State Constitutions, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403 (1999); William C. Rave, State
Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 543 (1998); Daan Braveman,
Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403 (1999). For a
discussion of the importance of using international human rights law, see Dorothy Q.
Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the U.S.: An Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 15 (1996).
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welfare system (and, potentially, other poverty programs that could
soon be block-granted, including Food Stamps, Medicaid and
Section 8 housing programs) through the use of procedural due
process protections is not only consistent with federalism, but
critical to its functioning.
I. Federalism and Devolution of the Welfare System
Congress has actively participated in the current federalism, as
illustrated by the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) of 1996.13 The 1996 federal welfare law resulted in a
monumental shift in power over welfare policy from federal to state
and local governments by eliminating a federal "entitlement"
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and
replacing it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
a state-run block grant program.' 4 The impetus behind the 1996 law
was to devolve authority and responsibility for poverty policy to the
individual states, which could then further devolve responsibility to
counties. Devolution was premised on the theory that states, and
not the federal government, have the greatest understanding of the
needs of the poor and thus should have primary responsibility for
crafting and implementing poverty policies.' 5 The result is a
kaleidoscope of welfare systems throughout the country.' 6
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-08 (2005).
14. The former AFDC was a cooperative federal-state welfare program established
by Title IV of the Social Security Act as the basic federal need-based income transfer
program for dependent children and their caretaker relatives. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17
(1988). In exchange for administering AFDC in compliance with federal law, the states
were reimbursed by the federal government for a portion of the benefits provided to
recipients. Although not required to do so, all fifty states participated in the program.
TANF, AFDC's replacement, expired in October 2002, and has been extended by a
series of Congressional resolutions until December 31, 2005. Plans for reauthorizing the
federal welfare law are currently being debated in Congress. At publication, the law
had not yet been reauthorized. Nevertheless, none of the plans being considered would
change the basic premise of the 1996 law: that states should be given broad flexibility
with minimum oversight and accountability for designing and implementing programs
for the poor.
15. See 104 CONG. REC. H3352-98 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1999) (statement of Hon. Bill
Archer on Personal Responsibility Act of 1995).
16. As Professor Peter Edelman states: "To know what the rights of poor are
around the country, we would need to read fifty-one statute books and, given the
variations among counties, thousands of pages of implementing regulations and local
laws." Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Lawyers,
24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 547, 549 (1998) (citing to studies describing the
variations in state welfare laws and policies). See also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L.
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Devolution has changed the landscape of welfare. Under
AFDC, states were required to provide assistance to all families who
applied for it and met federal and state eligibility criteria. 17 The 1996
welfare law replaced this system with block grant funding to the
states, which the states may use "in any manner reasonably
calculated to accomplish the purposes" of the law.' 8 Under TANF,
states define their own "objective criteria" for deciding who may
receive assistance,19 subject to constitutional limitations and the
requirement that states be "fair and equitable" in establishing these
criteria,20 and so long as they do not provide benefits to certain
identified classes of individuals.21  Provided they meet the
minimum requirements of the federal law, states may also set their
own time limits on welfare benefits,22 establish their own work
REV. 1121, 1147 (2000) (describing nonuniform state response to PRWORA). For a
description of state policy choices on TANF programs in the fifty states and District of
Columbia, see State Policy Documentation Project (SPDP), at http://www.spdp.org.
In addition to the program changes described in this section, devolution has
significantly altered how state welfare programs are funded. Under AFDC, the states
and the federal government participated under the model of "cooperative federalism,"
whereby state welfare programs were funded jointly by federal and state governments,
with the federal government paying for at least 50% of a state's welfare expenditures. 42
U.S.C. § 603 (1991) (amended 1996). Under this system, states received an open-ended
stream of funding, depending on their caseload and own contribution. In contrast,
under the block grant system established by TANF, states receive a fixed amount of
federal funding. For fiscal year(s) (FY) 1996 through 2002, the amount of federal funds a
state received was tied to the amount it received under the AFDC program in previous
years, and not to the state's current caseload, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2002), and TANF
established that $16.5 billion be dispersed each year to the states. Id. In general, states
are required to spend no less than 80% of what they spent in FY 1994 for AFDC, a
requirement known as the "maintenance of effort" provision. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)
(2005); 45 C.F.R. § 263.1 (2000). States may, however, spend down to 75% of what they
spent in FY 1994 if they meet the work participation rates set forth in the law. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(a) (2005).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (2005). These purposes are: (1) to provide assistance to
needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of
relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy families on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and
reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and
maintenance of two-parent families. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(1)-(4) (2005).
19. "The term 'assistance' includes cash payments, vouchers, and other forms of
benefits designed to meet a family's ongoing basic needs (i.e., for food, clothing, shelter,
utilities, household goods, personal care items, and general incidental expenses)." 45
C.F.R. § 260.31(a)(1) (2005).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 602.
21. For example, states are prohibited from providing welfare benefits to teenage
parents who do not attend high school or training programs, 42 U.S.C. § 608 (2005), and
those not living in adult-supervised settings. Certain legal immigrants are also barred
from receiving benefits. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612-46 (2005).
22. The federal law limits receipt of federal benefits to sixty months in a lifetime,
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participation and compliance requirements, 23 and determine what
type of assistance to provide.24 States do not have to provide cash
assistance with their TANF funds; they may also use their funds for
education and job training, child care, transportation, services
addressing barriers to employment (including mental health and
domestic violence), and a wide range of other services to meet the
purposes of TANF.25 Finally, language in the 1996 law purports to
eliminate the entitlement to federal assistance that existed under
AFDC.26 The significance of this language will be discussed, infra.
Devolution under the PRWORA also allows for considerable
privatization of the welfare system. The 1996 welfare law contains a
provision allowing states to operate their welfare programs
"through contract with charitable, religious or private
organizations." 27 Many states have since turned to large national
and sometimes multinational private corporations to conduct case
management, employment services, support services, and other
specialized services, including mental health and substance abuse
treatment, for their welfare applicants and recipients. 28 Nearly all of
but states may set stricter time limits. 42 U.S.C § 608(a)(7). States may choose to use
their state maintenance of effort money to provide benefits to people who have already
exceeded the federal limit. Id.
23. TANF establishes certain work participation requirements, but as with time
limits, states are free to set more stringent requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(1)(A)(ii),
607; 45 C.F.R. § 261 (2005).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604 (2005).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a), 609(a)(7)(B)(i)(IV); 45 C.F.R. §§ 263.2(b), 263.11(a) (2000).
States may also transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF funds into the Child Care and
Development Block Grant Program and/or Title XX, the Social Services Block Grant
Program. 42 U.S.C. § 604(d). TANF funds must be used to serve needy families with
children. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
Among the other options open to states are the Family Violence Option, which
allows states to exempt domestic violence victims from certain welfare requirements that
make it more difficult to escape their abuser and keep themselves and their families safe,
id. § 602(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. §§ 260.50-.57, and the affirmative "opt out" of the ban on TANF
assistance for persons with felony drug convictions. 21 U.S.C. § 826a(d)(1) (2002). For a
comprehensive description of the choices available to states under TANF, see Wendy
Pollack, An Introduction to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, 36
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 449 (2003), available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/legalresearch/articles/index.cfm?action=articlesbydate
&date=5-Jan-03.
26. Section 103(a)(1) of the PRWORA states that "this part shall not be interpreted
to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under
this part." 42 U.S.C. § 601(b).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a).
28. See Pamela Winston et al., Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the
Literature, submitted to Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 13-14, at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/privatization02/report.pdf (May 2002). States are also
contracting with large nonprofit corporations and smaller community-based
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the states and the District of Columbia have contracted with a
nongovernmental entity for the provision of some welfare-related
function at the state and/or local level.29 Privatization of the welfare
system raises a number of concerns, including the ability of
recipients to hold corporate entities accountable for their actions,
and the ability of recipients to enforce their rights in a privatized, as
opposed to state-administered, system.30
Finally, devolution allows states to delegate significant
discretion to individual caseworkers and local welfare
administrators, resulting in what Professor Matthew Diller describes
as "the concentration of power in the hands of ground-level
administrators."31 Thus, not only do state and county welfare
programs exercise their own discretion to set certain standards and
requirements, such as time limits and work participation, 32 they also
call on front-line welfare caseworkers to make a number of critical
judgments, such as whether an applicant is excused from work,
what type of work he or she is capable of, whether the individual
has access to suitable child care, and whether the applicant has a
good excuse for missing an assignment or appointment. 33 In many
cases, front line workers decide what types of programs and
services applicants and recipients are eligible and suitable for, and
whether they should be referred to a particular training or
educational program. 34 Given the already overwhelming nature of
organizations to administer welfare-related functions. Id. at 13-14.
29. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Welfare Reform: Federal Oversight of State and Local
Contracting Can be Strengthened, at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-661
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005). At least three states, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Florida, have
contracted out the administration for all aspects of their TANF programs, including
eligibility determinations in some locations, while other states and welfare agencies
contract out only a portion of their case management functions. Winston, supra note 28,
at 14.
30. See Diller, supra note 16, at 1198. Moreover, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) report identified that state and local governments have significant problems with
both contract oversight and contractor performance. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra
note 29. See also Henry Freedman et al., Uncharted Terrain: The Intersection of Privatization
and Welfare, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 557, 563-65 (2002).
31. Diller, supra note 16, at 1164.
32. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
33. See Diller, supra note 16, at 1148-50 (citing examples).
34. New York City's welfare system provides a strong example of how
caseworkers exercise discretion. In New York City, throughout the welfare application
process and while an individual receives public assistance, he or she must meet with a
series of workers who determine eligibility for benefits. For example, once a welfare
application is filed, applicants must keep daily appointments throughout the City to
comply with work requirements and complete verification interviews, including
reporting to the City's office of Eligibility Verification Review in Brooklyn. Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y., Welfare Reform in New York City: The Measure of Success,
Committee on Social Welfare Law, 56 THE REC. 322, 330 (Summer 2001), available at
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their work, welfare workers often do not have the time to fully
explain the options available to claimants or to assist them in
making the best choices for their individual circumstances. 35
Thus, welfare reform and devolution mean little uniformity,
with welfare workers playing a significant role in their clients' lives.
And, as will be discussed more fully in Section III B, infra, there is
growing evidence that this increased discretion given to ground
level workers introduces a significant risk of racial bias and
discrimination influencing their individual determinations,
particularly with regard to sanctioning and access to support
services. With fewer federal guidelines to standardize these
decisions and fewer avenues for legal redress, however, poor people
have fewer ways to challenge such discrimination.36
http://www.abcny.org/Publications/record/summer01.pdf. Individuals with
conditions that might limit their ability to work must attend multiple appointments for
medical or psychiatric evaluations with a private agency which contracts with the city to
do such evaluations. Id. Welfare workers determine whether individuals are in
compliance at each step of the way and assign welfare applicants and recipients to job
search activities, job training, or work assignments. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp.
2d 331, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing the public assistance application process in the
early days of welfare reform in New York City).
35. See Evelyn Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and Accountability in
State Welfare Administration, 71 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 12-17 (1997) (discussing how discretion
vested in "street-level workers" to allocate services such as job skills and training may
result in inadequate and inappropriate assessments and placements, due to the fact that
caseworkers ration the information they provide and do not have the resources and
ability to elicit and respond to all of a client's needs). See also Diller, supra note 16, at
1164-65 (discussing resistance of caseworkers to increased demands, including the
requirement that they make more evaluative, discretionary decisions).
36. At the same time, welfare reform is resulting in a dramatic change in the racial
composition of the welfare rolls. Whites are leaving the welfare rolls faster and more
minorities are remaining, with Latinos becoming the fastest growing population
receiving welfare. Elizabeth Lower-Basch, "Leavers" and Diversion Studies: Preliminary
Analysis of Racial Differences, Office of the Assistant Sec'y for Planning and Evaluation,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., at
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/leavers99/race.htm (updated Sept. 15, 2003); Jason
DeParle, Shrinking Welfare Rolls Leave Record High Share of Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1998, at Al. Specifically, while overall state TANF caseloads declined approximately
44% between August 1996 and September 1999, from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 1998,
the white percentage of the caseload fell about 8%, while the black percentage rose by
almost 5%, and the Hispanic percentage rose by over 7%. Steve Savner, Welfare Reform
and Racial/Ethnic Minorities: The Questions to Ask, 9 POVERTY AND RACE, POVERTY AND
RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL 3 (July/August 2000). Moreover, black and Latino
families who leave the welfare system have a much greater likelihood of returning than
white families. According to a recent study, overall, one in five families leaving welfare
return. Yet among African American families leaving welfare, 32% return, compared
with 24% of Latino families and just 13% of white families. Pamela J. Loprest, Who
Returns to Welfare, Urban Institute, at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310548 (Sept.
1, 2002). The result is a change in the overall racial demographics of the welfare
population. Prior to federal welfare reform, in 1995, the welfare caseload was 35.6%
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II. Challenging Race Discrimination Within the Welfare
System Post-Sandoval
Minorities, and especially poor people of color, have long been
limited in their ability to challenge governmental actions that
disparately impact them. In Jefferson v. Hackney,37 the Supreme
Court rejected a claim brought by welfare recipients in Texas
challenging that state's formula for calculating public assistance
benefits as racially discriminatory because of its disparate impact on
blacks. In upholding the state's method under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court held that a "naked statistical argument" does not
suffice for showing racial discrimination by welfare procedures that
have a disproportionate adverse impact on minorities. 38 Four years
later, in Washington v. Davis,39 the Supreme Court made explicit the
requirement that all challenges to state action based on the Equal
Protection Clause must show an intent to discriminate on the basis
of an invidious classification.40 Although the Court stated that it is
not necessary for the discriminatory purpose to be express or appear
on the face of a statute, proof of disparate impact alone was
insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.41
The Court's intent requirement has been criticized on grounds
that it misses the often subtle, or "unconscious," ways in which
racism operates in society.42 As Professor Charles Lawrence notes,
requiring proof of conscious and intentional discrimination
"disregards both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect
that the history of American race relations has had on the individual
and collective unconscious." 43 In addition, Professor Kenneth Karst
argues that the intent doctrine places a burden of proof on plaintiffs
that is extremely difficult to overcome, since improper motives can
White, 37.2% African American, and 20.7% Latino. Lower-Basch, supra. By 1999, the
population shifted to 30.5% White, 38.3% African American, and 24.5% Latino. Id.
37. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
38. Id. at 548.
39. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
40. Id. at 239.
41. Id. at 241. See also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (applying the intentional
discrimination requirement to Equal Protection challenges involving gender-based
discrimination). Later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court explained that proof of discriminatory intent could
include clear patterns that emerge from the challenged action that cannot be explained
on any grounds other than race, a historical background of the decision revealing an
invidious purpose, and the legislative or administrative history of the action. Id. at 252.
42. Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego and the Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
43. Id. at 323.
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easily be hidden.44
Thus, while on very rare occasions courts have found that
welfare laws intentionally discriminate against people of color in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause,45  intentional race
discrimination in the context of welfare is difficult to prove,
particularly where caseworkers exercise significant discretion in
how they assess recipients and connect them with critical services.46
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, civil rights statutes can be
used to challenge discrimination based on a disparate impact
theory. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any program
receiving federal financial assistance.47 While the text of the statute,
specifically § 601, prohibits intentional discrimination,48 § 602 of the
law authorizes federal agencies to enact regulations that prohibit
actions having a disproportionate, adverse impact on racial
minorities. 49 Pursuant to this provision, the Department of Health
and Human Services has promulgated such regulations relating to
44. See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 154 (1989) ("When the discriminatory purpose doctrine is applied
rigorously, its practical result is to convert the burden of proof of improper motive into a
substitute rule for upholding governmental action.").
45. See Whitfield v. Oliver, 399 F. Supp. 348 (M.D. Ala. 1975), affid, Whitfield v.
Burns, 431 U.S. 910 (1977). Whitfield was brought by Alabama AFDC recipients
challenging racial discrimination in the administration of the state's welfare program.
The plaintiffs claimed that the disparities in the allocation and payment by the Alabama
Department of Pensions and Securities of AFDC (Alabama Department), which was
received by a predominantly black population, and Old Age Insurance, which was
received by a predominantly white population, were racially discriminatory.
Recognizing that discriminatory purpose and effect must be proven by more than a
"naked statistical argument," the United States District Court nevertheless found
sufficient evidence of intentional race discrimination. This evidence included statistical
disparities between the populations serviced by the two forms of public assistance, an
increasing percentage of black AFDC recipients in conjunction with the increasingly
preferential treatment of Old Age Insurance recipients, an awareness of Alabama
officials of AFDC's racial composition, testimony by the former commissioner of the
Alabama Department, the previous record of the Alabama Department with respect to
racial matters, and the lack of an adequate official explanation for the disparities. Id. at
352-57. Significantly, the Court examined the long history of Alabama's discrimination
against blacks, particularly through political disenfranchisement, and ruled that any
explanation given for the disparity in funding of the AFDC and Old Age Insurance
programs was insufficient. Id. at 357.
46. See Lawrence, supra note 42, at 322 (stating that "[tiraditional notions of intent
do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by
factors that can be characterized as neither intentional.., nor unintentional ... .
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000).
48. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001) (discussing cases in
which the Court held that § 601 reaches only intentional discrimination).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1).
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welfare.50 The 1996 welfare law requires that states comply with the
civil rights laws,51 and the Office for Civil Rights within the
Department of Health and Human Services, which has enforcement
powers under Title VI, receives, investigates and prosecutes
complaints of Title VI violations in the welfare context.52 Until
recently, individuals have been able to sue to enforce such violations
as well.
In 2001, however, the Supreme Court curtailed the ability of
individuals to enforce this civil rights protection. In Alexander v.
Sandoval, the Court rejected a challenge brought pursuant to the
implementing regulations of Title VI and predicated on a disparate
impact discrimination theory.53 The case challenged Alabama's
official policy of issuing the state driver's license test in English
only, alleging that the policy had a disparate impact on non-English
speakers, thus discriminating against them based on their national
origin.54  The plaintiff sued under regulations issued by the
Departments of Justice and Transportation, pursuant to § 602 of
Title VI, prohibiting recipients of federal funding from "utilizing
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
50. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2005). The Department of Health and Human Services
regulations state, in pertinent part:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other benefits,
or facilities which will be provided under such program, or the class of
individuals to whom, or the situations in which, such services, financial aid,
other benefits, or facilities will be provided under any such program, or the
class of individuals to be afforded an opportunity to participate in any such
program, may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements,
utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin.
Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 608(d) (2005). That provision states, in relevant part:
The following [nondiscrimination] provisions of law shall apply to any program or
activity which receives funds provided under this part:
(1) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.).
(2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794).
(3) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
(4) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq.).
Id.
52. See Letter of Findings, Docket No. 02-99-3130 (Office of Civil Rights, Region II,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Oct. 21, 1999) (finding that welfare agencies in
New York City and two suburban counties routinely discriminated against persons of
limited English proficiency and with hearing impairments, and offering the local
agencies the opportunity to develop plans to serve such clients).
53. 532 U.S. 275.
54. Id. at 278.
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subjecting individuals to discrimination because of race, color, or
national origin."55
No explicit private right of action exists under Title VI or its
regulations, but the Court had previously approved of a lower court
decision allowing for a private right of action to enforce § 601's
prohibition on purposeful discrimination.56 Yet in Sandoval, the
Court held that individuals may not bring private suits to enforce
Title VI's disparate regulations, as authorized by § 602 of the law.
Specifically, the Court held that neither the text nor the structure of
§ 602 evince an intent to create a private right of action, and that the
regulations alone do not create such a right.57
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested an alternate route for
enforcing the regulations: an enforcement action through 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.58 It is well-settled that certain rights created under federal
law are enforceable through § 1983. 59 Yet, § 1983 claims to enforce
Title VI's disparate impact regulations have been rejected by at least
two U.S. Courts of Appeals, and in its 2002 term, the Supreme Court
appeared to issue the death knell for such claims as well.60
55. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2001) (U.S. Dep't of Justice regulation); 49 C.F.R. §
21.5(b)(2) (2000) (U.S. Dep't of Transportation regulation).
56. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
57. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 (stating that "[n]either as originally enacted nor as
later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of
action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602").
58. Id. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) provides, in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
The Supreme Court has set forth a three-part analysis for determining when federal
statutes in fact create federal rights enforceable through § 1983, with Congress's intent to
create such a right being paramount. The three-part test requires that (1) Congress must
have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the right assertedly protected is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the states. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41
(1997).
59. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980) (holding that causes of action under §
1983 are not limited to claims based on constitutional or equal rights violations, but
rather certain rights created by federal statute are enforceable through § 1983 as well).
60. The Third Circuit, in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), considered a challenge by a
community group in South Camden, New Jersey, to a state agency's decision to issue an
air permit to a cement processing facility. The plaintiff community group alleged that
the agency engaged in discrimination because of the disparate racial impact that the
decision would have on the community. Having lost a private right of action to enforce
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Thus, plaintiffs attempting to challenge race discrimination in
the administration of federally funded programs are limited in their
ability to hold states and other recipients of federal funds
accountable for such discrimination under a disparate impact
theory. Enforcement of Title VI's implementing regulations now
rests with federal agencies, including the Office for Civil Rights
within the Department of Health and Human Services, leaving
individuals dependent upon the government to challenge such
discrimination. Underenforcement of Title VI by the federal
government is a concern, however, particularly in the welfare
context, where the federal government, via devolution, has ceded
control to states and localities on the theory that they are best
positioned to act in this area. As one commentator notes, Sandoval
has "disarmed private attorneys general," by precluding individuals
from ensuring the full enforcement of Congress' civil rights laws. 61
Title VI's implementing regulations after the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval, the
plaintiff amended its complaint to bring a cause of action to enforce the regulations
under § 1983. Id. at 776. The Third Circuit rejected the § 1983 claim, however, stating
that because the disparate impact regulations create an interest that is not implicit in
Title VI, which only prohibits intentional discrimination, they are not enforceable
through § 1983 either. Id. at 788-89. The touchstone of the court's analysis was that the
regulations attempted to create a federal right beyond that intended by Congress in
enacting Title VI. Id. at 783-84. The court held that "a federal regulation alone may not
create a right enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing
statute." Id. at 790.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002),
appears to ratify this limitation on plaintiffs' ability to enforce Title VI disparate impact
regulations through section 1983. In Gonzaga, the Court explained that the threshold
inquiry in determining whether there lies a right enforceable through § 1983 rests on
whether "Congress intended to create afederal right." Id. at 283. The Court reaffirmed that
"for a statute to create such federal rights, its text must be 'phrased in terms of the
persons benefited.'" Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 692 n.13). The Court noted
that, for example, both the statutory provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 "create individual rights because
those statutes are phrased 'with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.'" Id.
(quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691). The Court's finding in Sandoval that neither the text
nor the structure of § 602 of Title VI evinces an intent to create a private right of action,
532 U.S. at 293, likely precludes § 1983 actions to enforce the disparate impact
regulations as well. Indeed, in the wake of Gonzaga, the Ninth Circuit has so held. See
Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (basing its decision
that Department of Transportation's disparate impact regulation, promulgated pursuant
to Title VI, does not create an individual federal right enforceable through § 1983 on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga). See also LeChuga v. Crosley, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (D. Or. 2002) (no § 1983 claim to enforce regulations adopted by
Department of Labor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602); Ceaser v. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (no § 1983 claim to enforce disparate impact regulations
adopted by the former New York State Department of Housing, Education and Welfare
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602).
61. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
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III. Procedural Due Process Protections and Closing the
Federalism Gap
As described previously, poor and low-income people of color
may fall into the gap where devolution intersects with diminished
protection against discrimination. Poor people come into frequent
contact with the government, relying on government workers and
offices to provide critical benefits, as well as coming under greater
scrutiny for alleged infractions. 62 Indeed, as Judge Patricia Wald
states, "[t]he neediest of our citizens are most conspicuously
dependent on government largesse for the satisfaction of their most
basic needs."63 Devolution means that welfare workers play an even
greater role in the lives of their clients. They connect recipients with
support services, which are critical for recipients to transition
successfully from welfare into the workforce, and help recipients
identify appropriate training and education programs, job
placement programs and other services that help them to move off
of welfare. Yet, recent studies, discussed in greater detail below,
suggest that devolution puts recipients at greater risk of being
discriminated against because of personal and institutional race
bias. To cite one example, a study of Wisconsin's welfare system
found "a consistent pattern of racial and ethnic disparities in the use
of sanctions" against participants in the state's welfare program.64
Though devolution and caseworker discretion may in fact have
significant adverse effects on poor people of color, it is difficult to
prove that such effect is the result of intentional discrimination.
And after Sandoval, private individuals are precluded from
challenging, under Title VI, policies and practices based on their
disparate and adverse impact on persons of color. These limitations
suggest the need for additional protections against race
discrimination in the welfare system.
183, 187-88 (2002).
62. For example, there is a strong association between receipt of welfare benefits
and the involvement of the child welfare system in a family's life. Indeed, children who
receive welfare are at greater risk for involvement with the child welfare system.
Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform Ends in 2002: What's Ahead
for Low-Income and No-Income Families? Welfare Reform and Families in the Child Welfare
System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386, 410 (2002) (citing research estimating that approximately 50
percent of the families referred to the child welfare system received welfare at the time
of the referral).
63. Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gift Horse, in THE
UNPREDICTABLE CONSTITUTION 7,22 (Norman Dorsen ed., 2002).
64. Kathleen Mulligan-Hansel & Pamela S. Fendt, Unfair Sanctions: Does W-2
Punish People of Color?, 2002 INSTITUTE FOR WISCONSIN's FUTURE 1, 3 (Oct. 2002). This
and additional studies will be discussed more fully in Section III B, infra.
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Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
procedural due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment provide
essential protections for poor people. This section will examine
courts' continuing recognition of procedural due process rights for
the poor and explore how, consistent with the current federalism,
such protections may be used to address race discrimination within
a devolved welfare system.
A. Procedural Due Process and Race Discrimination
At its core, procedural due process prevents against the unfair
administration of government benefits.65 Indeed, Goldberg v. Kelly,
the seminal case affirming the right to procedural due process in the
welfare context, was brought to remedy the unfairness inherent in
the arbitrary administration of basic necessities in New York City's
welfare system. 66 This is consistent with preventing and remedying
the disparate impact of standardless, discretionary decision
making. 67  Specifically, public assistance recipients who are
disparately impacted by caseworkers and other welfare workers
exercising their discretion in a racially biased manner can assert that
such decisions are made possible by and result from a lack of
65. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (due process
"expresses requirements of 'fundamental fairness'"). See also Carey v. Quem, 588 F.2d
230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) ("In the context of eligibility for welfare assistance, due process
requires at least that the assistance program be administered in such a way as to insure
fairness and avoid the risk of arbitrary decision making.") (citing White v. Roughton,
530 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1976)); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262,
265 (2d Cir. 1968)).
66. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 87-90 (discussing the
arbitrariness of New York City caseworkers' actions that Goldberg sought to remedy);
Jeffrey, supra note 10, at 164 (noting that Goldberg responded to and remedied to a
history of arbitrary administration of public assistance programs, due in large part to the
unfettered discretion of caseworkers).
67. A due process claim may seek injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination.
Compensatory damages, however, may be more difficult to obtain. While a due process
claim itself may not provide for the damages that were available under Title VI,
plaintiffs may, in some cases, be able to bring a § 1983 claim against municipalities for
compensatory damages once they have established that a due process violation has
occurred. The 11th Amendment precludes recovery of such compensatory damages
against the state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Where the state has delegated
authority to administer welfare systems to localities, however, welfare administrators
may not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, and plaintiffs may be able to recover
damages, although recovering such damages in the welfare context can be difficult. For
a discussion of the challenges of obtaining compensatory and other damages in welfare,
and in particular procedural due process, litigation, see Randal S. Jeffrey, Facilitating
Welfare Rights Class Action Litigation: Putting Damages and Attorney's Fees to Work, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 281, 303-13 (2003).
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appropriate procedures, in violation of the right to procedural due
process. To state this constitutional claim, potential plaintiffs must
satisfy the two-step due process inquiry: (1) whether they have
been deprived of an interest in life, liberty or property; and (2)
whether the appropriate process has been granted, i.e., whether the
procedures followed were constitutionally sufficient.68 This section
discusses each prong in turn.
1. Property Interest in the Receipt of Public Assistance Benefits in the
Era of TANF
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court established that welfare
recipients have a property interest in their receipt of welfare benefits
which is protected by procedural due process.69 Welfare reform
calls into question whether recipients can still claim a property
interest in their benefits, yet there are strong arguments in favor of
individuals' continued enjoyment of procedural due process
protections.
Section 401(b) of the PRWORA states explicitly that "[t]his part
shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any state program funded under this part."70 The
existence of an "entitlement" appeared essential to the Goldberg
analysis; in establishing procedural due process protections for
welfare recipients, the Court first had to confirm that welfare
recipients have a property interest in their receipt of benefits. 71 The
Court found that welfare benefits are, indeed, a form of property
created by the state, as they are "a matter of statutory entitlement
for persons qualified to receive them." 72 Thus, individuals who
meet the eligibility requirements for benefits have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to any benefits provided under the welfare
law, and may not be deprived of such benefits without due process
68. Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Laudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 541 (1985).
69. Id. at 262. In Goldberg, New York City AFDC recipients challenged a city policy
which failed to afford them a pre-termination fair hearing. Id. at 256. According to the
City's policy, welfare recipients whose benefits were terminated were only allowed to
challenge the loss of benefits after they were in fact lost. Id. at 257. Moreover, there was
no provision for personal appearance before the reviewing official for oral presentation
of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 259. The Court ruled that
the post-termination procedures were insufficient to protect the welfare recipients' due
process rights and ordered the City to institute pre-termination hearings. Id. at 264-66.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1996).
71. 397 U.S. at 261-62.
72. Id. at 262 n.8.
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of law.73
Because TANF contains language purporting to eliminate
welfare benefits' "entitlement" status, it may be argued that, since
states are no longer statutorily required to provide benefits to those
deemed eligible for them, individuals no longer have a property
interest in their benefits. Moreover, under TANF states are given
wide latitude to reduce welfare programs and administrative
protections, which could obviate the due process protections that
arise from a statutory entitlement. The "no entitlement" language
would appear to undermine the procedural due process protections
that welfare recipients have relied upon since Goldberg.
Nevertheless, there is strong support for welfare recipients'
continued constitutional right to due process in their receipt of
benefits, TANF's language regarding "entitlements"
notwithstanding. First, PRWORA's language cannot, on its own,
eliminate due process protections. 74 Moreover, in Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme Court clarified that determination
of whether an individual has a property interest giving rise to due
process protections hinges on the nature of the interest, specifically
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation in the receipt of
benefits, such that due process protections attach: "[t]o have a
property interest in a government benefit, a person must have more
than a unilateral expectation, she must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it."75 Yet that "legitimate claim of entitlement"
depends on the statute defining eligibility for the benefit. As the
Court stated in Roth, "[piroperty interests.. .are created and their
dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law--rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits." 76
Discretion plays a strong role in this determination. Courts are
more likely to find that individuals have a reasonable expectation in
the receipt of benefits where a statute contains mandatory,
substantive criteria limiting the government's discretion.77 On the
73. Id.
74. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Laudermill, the Supreme Court held that states are
not able to define away procedural due process rights. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). In that
case, the Court held that while state law may be the source of property interests, it
cannot trump the Constitution in determining the appropriate procedural safeguards
that attach to the interest. Id.
75. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
76. Id. at 577.
77. Id. See Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469,476 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Roth for
the proposition that "if the statutory scheme comprehensively sets forth the conditions
under which claims of entitlement attach, and the individual recipient meets those
conditions, the official decision maker merely acts as a conduit for distribution of
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other hand, where government discretion is unfettered, individuals
are more likely not to have a vested property interest in benefits,
and thus procedural due process protections are not triggered. 78 For
example, in Washington Legal Clinic for Homeless v. Barry,79 a group of
plaintiffs who were seeking emergency shelter asserted a procedural
due process challenge. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a local law's explicit statement that "nothing...
shall be construed to create an entitlement in any homeless person
or family to emergency shelter" was not dispositive of whether the
plaintiffs did, in fact, have a property interest in their benefits giving
rise to a procedural due process claim.80 Rather, in determining
whether due process rights attach, the court held that it must first
examine the amount of discretion the statute vested in the agency to
allocate the shelter.8' Noting that the less discretion a state official
has to determine a benefit, the more likely the benefit is a "property
right," the court held that because, in that case, agency
administrators did in fact have unfettered discretion in allocating
available shelter to the homeless, the emergency shelter program in
question did not create a constitutionally protected entitlement. 82
In the case of TANF, as discussed, supra, states do have a great
deal of discretion in structuring and administering their welfare
systems, as do caseworkers in handling individual cases. The
federal law, however, contains several important limitations on that
discretion, indicating that procedural due process still protects
access to and receipt of benefits. Significantly, the law requires that
states implementing TANF "set forth objective criteria for the
delivery of benefits and the determination of eligibility and for fair
and equitable treatment."83 And regulations implementing the
TANF law require states to develop procedural safeguards in their
administration of state welfare programs, as well as require states to
submit fair hearing plans to the federal government for review.8 4
welfare benefits. In such a situation, the potential recipient's compliance with the
statutory standards, rather than the decision of an official, gives rise to the welfare
benefit.").
78. See Wash. Legal Clinic for Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32,36 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 37-38. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
addressed a similar issue with regards to New York's Home Elderly Assistance Program
(HEAP). In Kapps v. Wing, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5333 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2005), the Second
Circuit held that applicants for HEAP benefits have a property interest in their benefits
so long as federal funds are available, since state law imposes "discretion-restricting"
guidelines for determining eligibility. 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5333, at *15-'22.
83. 42 U.S.C § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2005).
84. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1)(ii) (2004) ("Under this requirement hearings shall
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Thus, while states have discretion over whether to provide welfare
benefits, and caseworkers have discretion over significant decisions
regarding individual applicants' and recipients' cases, that
discretion is not unfettered; rather, the federal law explicitly
requires states to set forth discretion-constraining standards,
thereby preserving recipients' and applicants' procedural due
process rights.85
Indeed, while the "no entitlement" provision is perhaps, in the
words of Professor Christine Cirnini, "ambiguous," 86 Congress
likely did not intend to eviscerate due process protections under the
new law. For example, as Professor Cimini notes:
[O]ne plausible interpretation is that the 'no entitlement' language
is intended to refer to the time-limited nature of the TANF
program, as opposed to the unlimited nature of the AFDC
program. The provision could also mean that, as opposed to the
AFDC system ... when the block grant money awarded to a
particular state is depleted, the recipient is no longer entitled to a
benefit.87
The "no entitlement" provision could also refer to the fact that
an individual is ineligible for assistance unless he or she complies
with work and other requirements. 88
Professor Cynthia R. Farina, too, notes that the term
meet the due process standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and the standards set forth in this section."). See also Cimini,
supra note 10, at 112 (arguing that even with TANF's "no entitlement" provision,
welfare recipients maintain a legally cognizable property interest in welfare benefits and
are thus still entitled to procedural due process protections, as they have a legitimate
expectation of benefits for which they are eligible).
It is important to note, however, that in the wake of the 1996 welfare reform law,
several states have nevertheless restricted the due process rights of beneficiaries and
applicants to their welfare programs. For example, in Wisconsin, the administrative
agency for the welfare program in the state is only required to review agency decisions
involving the denial of an application based on the determination of financial eligibility,
and there is no requirement to continue benefits while an appeal is pending. Moreover,
the program does not require prompt review and notification. See Zietlow, supra note
10,at 37-38 (citing Wis. Stat. § 49.152(1) (1996)).
85. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted:
[Wihile there is no absolute right to the receipt of cash assistance payment in
the presence of other meaningful support, once the State has established a
scheme for making such payment, the State's scheme must provide the
program participants with adequate due process protections.
State of West Virginia ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 212 W. Va.
783, 799 (2002). See also Farina, supra note 10, at 619-21.
86. Cinini, supra note 10, at 111.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 112.
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"entitlement" has several meanings, and the "no entitlement"
provision of TANF perhaps undermined the entitlement status of
welfare assistance in some ways unrelated to procedural due process
protections.8 9 For example, an entitlement can refer to the right of
individuals to enforce provisions of federal law against state welfare
administrations, 90 and the right of states to claim reimbursement
from the federal government to defray the cost of providing
assistance to eligible individuals, both of which TANF may indeed
have eliminated.91 She notes, however, that an entitlement also
denotes the right to certain procedural protections when there exist
certain "discretion-constraining regulatory standards," as was at
issue in Roth.92 This is the case with TANF, and, as Farina states, the
"no entitlement" provision contained in TANF cannot undermine
this type of entitlement, since it is for the judiciary and not the
legislature to decide whether a statute creates a property interest.93
Indeed, post-AFDC, courts recognize that the "no entitlement"
clause in TANF is not dispositive in the due process determination.
At least three courts addressing the issue have held that TANF
benefits still fall within the protections of the Due Process Clause.94
2. The Process Due in a Devolved Welfare System
The second inquiry in the due process analysis, what process is
due, was first addressed in Goldberg v. Kelly but refined by the Court
in Matthews v. Eldridge.95 The balancing test the Court announced in
89. Farina, supra note 10, at 618.
90. Id. Farina notes that it was this type of entitlement that was at issue in King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968), discussed infra note 138.
91. Farina, supra note 10, at 618.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Weston, 37 P.3d at 476-77 (holding that the "no entitlement" provision within
TANF does not preclude finding of a protected property interest when other state
statutes require that assistance be provided to those who meet statutory criteria); State of
West Virginia ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 212 W. Va. 783, 799
(2002) (while the "no entitlement " provision means that there is no absolute right to
cash assistance, "once the state has established a scheme for making such payments, the
State's scheme must provide the program participants with adequate due process
protections"). See also Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (recognizing that plaintiffs "have
an overarching property interest in their continued receipt of food stamps, Medicaid,
and cash assistance").
95. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). At a minimum, due process requires notice and "the
opportunity to be heard ...at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) and
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for
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that case requires courts to weigh:
The private interest that will be affected by the official action;
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and . . . the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional requirement would
entail.96
Where standardless discretionary caseworker determinations,
i.e., insufficient procedural safeguards, disparately impact poor
people of color by curtailing their access to benefits and services, the
required process arguably is not provided.
a. The Critical Need for Benefits
First, under Goldberg, an individual's interest in receipt of
assistance is significant, indeed dire.97  In recognizing the
importance of procedural due process protections for welfare
recipients, the Court in Goldberg stated that "termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"). In the context of welfare benefits, that
means that the government must give welfare recipients timely and adequate notice
detailing the reasons for a proposed benefits termination, and a pre-termination hearing.
These pre-termination hearings must include the right to confront any adverse witnesses
and present arguments and evidence orally, the right to counsel at the hearing, and the
right to an impartial decision maker who makes decisions solely on the evidence
presented at the pre-termination evidentiary hearing. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71. In
determining what process was appropriate, the Court weighed the importance of
welfare to poor people, and the government's interest both in providing benefits and in
containing its fiscal and administrative costs. Id. at 264-66. Significantly, in weighing
these interests, the Court recognized the critical importance of welfare benefits both to
individuals and to the government; by meeting individuals' basic subsistence needs,
welfare promotes participation in the community, guards against "societal malaise," and
promotes the general welfare. Id. at 265.
The Court's due process inquiry was refined in the case of Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). In that case, the Court affirmed that an individual has a statutorily
created property interest in the continued receipt of benefits (in this case disability
insurance), and that due process included the right to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. Id. at 332-33.
96. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. But see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-
68 (2002) (rejecting Matthews balancing test as the appropriate framework for analyzing
due process violation in context of a challenge to notification procedure for forfeiture of
an inmate's property, in favor of "reasonableness" test set forth in Mullane, 339 U.S. 306).
97. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 ("For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means
to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.").
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waits."98 Where access to support services, rather than a wholesale
termination of benefits, is at stake, an individual's interest is no less
significant. Indeed, to a welfare recipient facing time limits, access
to any support service, such as transportation subsidies, child care,
training or education, which would facilitate finding and keeping
self-supporting work, is essential. 99
b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation, as Suggested by Disparate
Impact
Second, where standardless decision making has a disparate
adverse impact on poor people of color, potential plaintiffs can
show that the lack of the necessary procedural safeguards raises a
substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits and services. In
particular, potential plaintiffs can show that caseworkers, exercising
discretion with little oversight or check on inherent biases or
prejudices, make decisions which disproportionately harm people of
color, curtailing access to benefits and services that would enable
them to leave welfare for self-supporting work. This disparate
impact indicates that people of color run a substantial risk of being
erroneously deprived of welfare and supporting benefits.
Indeed, there is growing evidence that devolution has a
disparate discriminatory impact on African American and Latino
welfare recipients. In 2001, the United States Civil Rights
Commission reported on the experiences of minorities within the
U.S. welfare system, noting that:
[W]elfare reform has done little to eliminate historical
discrimination in public assistance. People of color encounter
insults and disrespect as they attempt to navigate the welfare
system. Women are subjected to sexual inquisitions at welfare
offices and sexual harassment at job activities. Individuals with
limited English proficiency encounter language barriers.
Immigrants are often turned away because of misconceptions
98. Id. at 264.
99. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, Staying Employed After Welfare: Work Supports and
Job Quality Vital to Employment Tenure and Wage Growth, 2002 Economic Policy Institute
Briefing Paper 23, at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapersibp128
(discussing the important role that childcare plays in helping mothers stay employed).
See also Karin Martinson & Julie Strawn, Built to Last: Why Skills Matter for Long-Run
Success in Welfare Reform, Center for Law and Soc. Policy 1, at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/BTL-report.pdf (April 2003) (discussing the
importance of education and training in the success of welfare recipients finding and
keeping higher quality jobs that provide higher wages).
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about their eligibility status.100
A study by the Institute for Wisconsin's Future examined
whether the change in the racial and ethnic composition of the
caseload of Wisconsin's welfare program, Wisconsin Works, or W-2,
was attributable to differential treatment of blacks and Latinos
through the state's sanctioning policy. Under the W-2 program,
participants incur sanctions in the form of loss of benefits when they
do not attend all of the activities required in their "employability
plan."101 The study found "a consistent pattern of racial and ethnic
disparities in the use of sanctions against W-2 participants."102
Specifically, the research revealed that African Americans and
Latinos were 75% and almost 50% more likely, respectively, to be
sanctioned than their white counterparts.1 03  The study cited
subjective program rules as a possible cause for the disparity, noting
that individual welfare agencies and case-managers are granted vast
discretion to determine when and whether a participant is
sanctioned and what constitutes a realistic employability plan in the
first instance. 04 Caseworkers have the discretion to determine what
supports and services a family may receive and what they are
required to do in return, including whether a family loses benefits
due to absence from an assigned work activity. l05 The researchers
concluded that the disparity in sanctioning rates "reveal[s] a
potential lack of fairness within W-2 because of racial or ethnic
bias."106
A study of Virginia welfare recipients found similar racial
disparities. 07 The study looked at two rural counties in northern
Virginia and the interactions between the welfare recipients and
their caseworkers to determine whether black and white welfare
clients received similar or different support from their
caseworkers. 08 It found that black welfare recipients reported
significantly less discretionary transportation assistance and less
100. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, A New Paradigm for Welfare Reform: The Need
for Civil Rights Enforcement, at www.usccr.gov/pubs/prwora/welfare.htm. See also
Rebecca Gordon, Cruel and Unusual: How Welfare "Reform" Punishes Poor People, Applied
Research Center 1, at http://www.arc.org/downloads/arcOlO2Ol.pdf (2001).
101. Kathleen Mulligan-Hansel & Pamela S. Fendt, Unfair Sanctions: Does W-2
Punish People of Color?, 2002 INSTITUTE FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE 1, 3 (Oct. 2002).
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at i.
104. Id. at i-ii.
105. Id.
106. Id. at iii.
107. Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworkers Support
Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR.-AM. PUB. POL'Y 23 (1998).
108. Id. at 25-26.
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support from caseworkers in accessing education than white
recipients.la 9 Moreover, the study found that fewer black recipients
received notification of potential jobs from their caseworkers and
were less likely to think that caseworkers treat similarly situated
black and white recipients fairly.110 For example, the study found
that 41% of white recipients, but none of the black recipients, were
encouraged by their caseworkers to pursue or complete their
education. 1 ' And 47% of white recipients and no black recipients
reported receiving transportation assistance other than gas
vouchers. 112 The report concluded that "[tiaken together, white
welfare recipients benefit considerably from the discretionary
actions of their caseworkers."" 3
Another study, surveying individuals who had come into
contact with the welfare system in thirteen states, found that as a
result of welfare reform and devolution to the state and local
entities, individuals suffered differential treatment due to the
arbitrary nature of the systems, and widespread discrimination
based on race, gender, language, and national origin.114 Moreover,
the study found that significantly more people of color than whites
were required to perform a work activity in order to receive
benefits, 115 and blacks and Native Americans were more likely to
have been sanctioned than members of other racial groups.116
Evidence of disparate racial impact can strongly suggest a real
risk of an "erroneous deprivation" of benefits, resulting from
caseworkers making arbitrary decisions and exercising unregulated
discretion in sanctioning, access to support services, and a host of
other determinations regarding eligibility and benefits. Similar to
the way in which it raises the inference of discrimination in the
employment context, 117 evidence of disparate impact in the welfare
context suggests that decision makers are making prohibited, thus
erroneous, determinations that deprive individuals of critical
benefits and services. Accordingly, plaintiffs able to show evidence
of such a disparate, adverse racial impact can argue that
standardless and discretionary decision making raises the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of benefits sufficient to satisfy the second
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 31-32.
111. Id. at 28.
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id. at 32.
114. Gordon, Cruel and Unusual, supra note 100, at 33-35.
115. Id. at 34.
116. Id.
117. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (articulating disparate
impact analysis in the Title VII employment context).
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prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis.
c. Value of Additional and Substitute Procedures
Numerous procedures could ameliorate or lessen the risk of the
disparate impact that may result from discretionary decision
making. For example, social service agencies could issue guidance
to workers on standards and procedures as well as provide ongoing
training on eligibility requirements and available support services
for which all recipients may be eligible. They could also provide
extensive and ongoing training concerning prohibited actions.118
Agencies could be required to keep statistical data to track, by race,
the measurable but discretionary assistance that individuals
receive,119 as well as be mandated to adopt a grievance procedure
for race discrimination allegations pertaining to individual
caseworker determinations. Moreover, they could be required to
implement a review mechanism to ensure that all recipients have
access to available programs and are not being unfairly steered
away from more helpful or appropriate ones.120
The type of remedy appropriate for a procedural due process
violation will certainly depend upon the type of discretion that has
resulted in a racial disparity. In some cases, a disparate racial
impact will result where a state or locality allows for caseworker
discretion, but places some standards on the exercise of that
discretion. For example, caseworkers may have discretion to refer
recipients to a particular job training program, but only if they meet
certain criteria. If a disproportionate number of people of color are
not referred to a particularly favorable program, an appropriate
remedy might require the state or local district to set a benchmark,
or quota, to ensure that people of color are not disproportionately
excluded from the program.
In other cases, where the district allows complete discretion
over a decision and sets no standards for exercising the decision, a
different remedy may be appropriate. For example, the district may
allow caseworkers to excuse recipients who show "good cause" for
missing an appointment, yet provide no definition of "good cause,"
leaving it entirely to the discretion of caseworkers. If people of color
are denied "good cause" excuses in numbers disproportionate to
whites, then perhaps a more appropriate remedy would be a
requirement that the district set more specific standards and
implement a review mechanism to oversee caseworker decisions.
118. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 100.
119. See Gooden, supra note 107, at 32.
120. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 100.
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The imposition of a variety of procedures and policies such as
these would provide a check on caseworkers' discretion and stem
the potential for race discrimination.
d. Government Interest in Allowing Caseworker Discretion
The government likely has a Strong interest in vesting
significant discretionary authority in ground-level caseworkers.
When caseworkers are able to exercise discretion in individual cases,
they have the flexibility to tailor services and benefits to the needs of
each applicant and recipient. However, the govermment's interest in
the flexibility that stems from discretionary decision making is not
necessarily diminished by adopting the procedural safeguards
suggested here. For example, standards and guidelines imposed on
caseworkers' exercise of discretion can aid caseworkers in making
individual determinations. They do not prohibit them from making
such decisions altogether. Likewise, by tracking discretionary
decisions, the government ensures that individual determinations
are made fairly and without a discriminatory impact, but does not
eliminate the ability of caseworkers to make such determinations.
Providing training on eligibility and availability for support services
as well as on prohibited actions ensures that caseworkers are fully
informed in the decisions that they make, but does not constrain
them from making decisions that are appropriate.
The additional procedures described above may entail some
cost to agencies. The cost may not be prohibitive or even
burdensome, however, and in fact in the long run may result in
savings. Individuals will likely be better able to achieve economic
self-sufficiency and thus have less need for public assistance if they
receive the appropriate and necessary support services, training and
job placement assistance.
B. Procedural Due Process Protections for the Poor and
Federalism
Goldberg v. Kelly was the culmination of years of work by
poverty lawyers to establish constitutional protections for the
poor.121 The case solidified procedural due process as a tool for
enforcing the rights of the poor in federal court,122 and in fact the
121. See DAVIS, supra note 7 (discussing the legal strategy to establish a
constitutional right to live, which resulted in baseline protections, including the Due
Process protections recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly).
122. See Jeffrey, supra note 10, at 289-90 (using client stories to illustrate the impact
that lack of due process has on poor families). See also Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742
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pre-termination hearing mandated in Goldberg was codified in the
AFDC statute.123 Procedural due process is thus widely recognized
as an essential protection for welfare recipients.124  As one
commentator notes, Goldberg and its explication of due process is
perhaps the more enduring of the early welfare cases: "Goldberg
may provide the most useful weapon to poverty advocates in the
1990s and beyond to assure that the poor are treated fairly and
equitably by welfare administrators."125
In the context of block granting, devolution, and limited federal
statutory protections, procedural due process protections also
further the principles underlying federalism by guarding against
state and local abuses, namely racial discrimination.
The story of race discrimination within the U.S. welfare system
is well-told.126 In short, although the 1935 Social Security Act
instituted a federal role for welfare and significantly expanded the
federal government's role and responsibility in, as well as
commitment of resources to, the provision of services for the poor,127
F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that county administered its general relief program in
violation of due process by arbitrarily denying benefits and failing to give notice of
appeal rights to applicants and recipients).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(4) (2005) ("A state plan for aid and services to needy families
and children must... provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the
State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children
is denied or is not acted on with reasonable promptness.").
124. See Rebecca Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights: The Importance of
Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111,
1114 (1996) (discussing importance of structured right, in particular procedural due
process rights, for low-income people, particularly women of color); see also Cesar A.
Persales, The Fair Hearing Process: Guardian of the Social Service System, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
889, 892 (1990) ("In the twenty years since Goldberg, the concept of due process has been
sewn into the fabric of our social welfare policy and institutionalized so well that it
permeates the practices and policies of the [New York Department of Social Services]
and local social services districts. This is due in great measure to the fair hearing
process."); see also Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit
Cases in the Block Grant Era, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 108 (1996) (discussing the
importance of pre-termination hearings in light of the discretion wielded by eligibility
workers). For a discussion of the cases elaborating on the due process protections that
apply to public assistance programs and recipients, see Jeffrey, supra note 10, at 289.
125. Alan W. Housman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the
1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 836 (1990).
126. See ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE, RACE AND THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 23-66 (1998) (discussing how race structured the foundation
of the American welfare state); see also JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW
RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 21-119 (1994).
127. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 126, at 48-56. Prior to the federal welfare law in
1935, public assistance was purely a local matter, and many localities in fact had in place
programs that discriminated against people who were not members of the community.
Indeed, colonial poor laws were modeled on the English poor laws, which stressed local
control and responsibility for the poor; poor laws focused on distinguishing local poor
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the federal law was brokered by compromise, particularly with the
Southern States. As a result, the law effectively excluded certain
populations, particularly African Americans, from coverage under
its more generous, fully federally funded programs, and allowed
vast state discretion and local control over the programs that did
include African Americans, enabling states to perpetuate
discrimination through lower benefit levels and tighter eligibility
rules for people of color.128
Established as a small program within the Social Security Act,
Aid to Dependent Children (AFDC's precursor) is particularly
rooted in racial stereotypes and discrimination. The program was
originally enacted as a nationalized version of the Mother's Pension,
which was intended to assist white widowed women in caring for
their children at home by making it unnecessary for them to
participate in the labor market.129 These families were deemed
"deserving" of assistance because of the important role that society
thought white women played in providing a good home for their
children.130
The population of ADC changed dramatically after World War
II from that of white widowed women to women whose husbands
had deserted or divorced them, as well as women who had never
people from "vagrants" or itinerant poor. MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 14-15 (1986).
128. See QUADAGNO, supra note 126 at 21-119. For example, the old age insurance
program, the Act's only exclusively federally funded program, protected workers aged
65 and older from loss of income due to retirement, yet contained strict eligibility rules
which categorically denied assistance to workers in certain industries dominated by
African Americans, including agricultural workers and domestic workers, thereby
effectively excluding African Americans from coverage. Id. at 21. And by allowing local
control over many programs, the Social Security Act ensured that Southern States could
set eligibility rules and benefit levels that effectively excluded African Americans,
ensuring their availability for low-wage labor markets such as sharecropping and
domestic service, and allowing for the continued unequal treatment of blacks and whites
through differential funding for various Social Security programs. See JILL QUADAGNO,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 16 (1998); see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF
WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 318 (1988);
LIEBERMAN, supra note 126, at 9.
129. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 37-64 (1994); see also Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of
Division Behavior Modification and Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 723 (1992).
130. Williams, supra note 129, at 723. See also MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING
POOR: FROM THE WAR ON THE POOR TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 68 (1989). "Deserving
poor" was used to distinguish between those whom society considers "worthy" of
assistance from those who are not. "Upright widows with children and old women
remained the quintessential worthy poor." Id. at 67. See also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note
128, at 319.
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married.131 The racial makeup of ADC families changed, too. The
percentage of families receiving ADC who were black increased
from 31% in 1950 to 48% in 1961.132 ADC shifted from a program
perceived as assistance for the "deserving poor" to one perceived as
being for the "undeserving poor."133 As historian Michael Katz
notes, "[11n AFDC, race, gender, and relief fused into a powerful and
degraded image that dominated attacks on the program and its
participants from the 1960s through its abolition by Congress in
1996."134
With the changed demographics of ADC came increased
eligibility restrictions aimed at preventing the program from being a
means of support for black, divorced, deserted, and never married
mothers. For example, "suitable home rules" were used to
disqualify children on the basis of the alleged immorality of their
mothers; "man in the house" and "substitute father" rules allowed
welfare workers to make unannounced visits to recipients' homes
and deny assistance to any woman found to be living with a man.135
Black women and their children were more vulnerable to these rules
and their amorphous and discretionary definitions, and thus these
measures disproportionately excluded black women and their
children from ADC support.136
131. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR, supra note 130, at 68. This change was due in
part to a change in the structure of the Social Security Act program. A 1939 amendment
to the Social Security Act allowed widows and children of workers who had been
eligible for old age insurance to receive benefits from the more generous old age
insurance program, leaving ADC as a "last resort" for divorced, deserted and never
married women. Michael Katz, Race, Poverty and Welfare: DuBois's Legacy for Policy, 568
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 111, 121 (2000); QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE, supra note 126, at 119.
132. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 128, at 321.
133. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR, supra note 130, at 68-69.
134. Id. at 121.
135. ABRAMOVrrZ, supra note 128, at 323-26. These rules were applied broadly,
enabling the state to deny assistance to single mothers who took in male boarders,
cohabited with men, refused to reveal the identity of fathers of extramarital children, or
"whose homes and behaviors simply did not look right to the investigating worker." Id.
at 324.
136. QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 126, at 100-151; ABRAMOVITZ,
supra note 128, at 326. Certain current welfare policies are arguably vestiges of the racial
stereotypes and ideologies that have historically undergirded the welfare system. For
example, the family cap, or child exclusion provision, has been adopted in some form by
23 states to deny an incremental increase of public assistance to children born into
families that are already receiving welfare. See Jodie Levin-Epstein, Lifting the Lid of the
Family Cap, States Revisit Problematic Policy for Welfare Mothers, Center for Law and Social
Policy 3, at http://www.clasp.org/publications/family-cap-brf.pdf (Dec. 2003) (listing
states with family cap provisions). Many commentators argue that these policies are
justified and informed in large part by the grossly mythologized "welfare queen," a
black woman who sits at home and "breeds children at the expense of the taxpayers in
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Accordingly, although the welfare law of 1996 was a watershed
moment in terms of allowing state and local discretion over welfare
law and policy, there has always been some element of local
discretion in the administration of welfare programs. And this state
and local discretionary treatment of the poor has long raised
constitutional concerns, including concerns of discrimination. For
example, the plaintiffs' lawyers in King v. Smith137 sought to prohibit
Alabama and other Southern states from invading the privacy of
and discriminating against African American public assistance
recipients through "man in the house" and "substitute father"
rules.138 Though deciding the matter on statutory grounds, the
Supreme Court in King v. Smith acknowledged that these rules were
often used to disguise systemic racism.139
It is precisely this type of discrimination at the state and local
level that federalism is designed to protect against. Although often
described in terms of protecting states' rights, federalism was, in
fact, originally conceived of as a way of protecting against
discrimination against politically vulnerable populations:
protecting the disadvantaged from the "tyranny of the state
majority." 140 Indeed, as Professor Sheryll Cashin notes, James
Madison's original vision of dual sovereignty was inspired by the
need to protect against local prejudices going unchecked by outside
order to increase the amount of her welfare check." DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1998); Dorothy
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and Right to
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1433 (1991). See also Lucy Williams, Race, Rat Bites and
Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1159, 1175 (1995); Williams, The Ideology of Division, supra note 129, at 721-25 (1992).
Likewise, eligibility restrictions on most immigrants' receipt of public assistance is
arguably informed by the perception that immigrants, largely Latino, flock to the United
States to derive benefit from tax-paying Americans, as well as the desire to discourage
immigrants of color from coming to the United States in the first place. See Kenneth J.
Neubeck & Noel A. Cazenave, Welfare Racism and its Consequences, in WORK, WELFARE
AND POLITICS 35, 38-39 (Francis Fox Piven et al. eds., 2002).
137. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
138. King challenged Alabama's substitute father rule, whereby a single mother on
welfare could not cohabitate with a man, regardless of whether he provided any support
for the family. Alabama's substitute father provision was one type of "man-in-the-
house" rule common in the Southern States. Id. King was the first welfare case decided
by the United States Supreme Court. A Brandeis brief provided to the Court in the case
informed the Court that 182 of the 184 welfare cases closed under the substitute father
provision in one county in Alabama from July 1964 to June 1966 involved black families,
and that in June 1966, in seven Alabama counties, all of the more than 600 recipients
whose welfare cases were closed were black. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 64.
139. 392 U.S. at 321-22.
140. Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting
for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 555 (1999).
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forces.14' Procedural due process, grounded in the 14th
Amendment, may protect against such discrimination.
Of course, there are several hurdles to the approach explored
here. First, its success hinges upon courts recognizing welfare
recipients' property interest in obtaining welfare benefits and
support services from caseworkers with substantial discretionary
authority. Second, such a claim would necessarily involve a
showing of disparate racial impact sufficient to show that
discretionary decision making raises a substantial risk of the
erroneous deprivation of benefits or access to support services. This
may limit the utility of the strategy to instances in which
comparative studies are possible, and may pose a difficult burden of
proof for plaintiffs alleging race discrimination.
Moreover, expanding procedural due process protections might
occur at the expense of more substantive rights. Professor Rebecca
Zietlow, who writes extensively about the procedural due process
rights of the poor, argues that the original promise of Goldberg has
not been realized, but rather Goldberg and its progeny have
instituted a "formalist" approach which has resulted in "a
bureaucratic state developed with an elaborate appellate process
that is alienating for many welfare recipients." 142 She nevertheless
recognizes the value of procedural, formal protections for poor
people, as the administrative process may be one of the few
available means of redress, and the "notion of formal rights
continues to resonate for the poor and the disenfranchised." 143
Thus, procedural due process, as explored here, offers an important
check on state and local discretion, with the potential of stemming
race discrimination and consistent with the protections envisioned
by a dual federalist system.
141. Id. (citing The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison)). Professor Cashin argues
that federal protections for the poor can be provided through minimum national
standards, rigorous evaluation, and reporting requirements. Id. at 625. See also James W.
Fox, Citizenship, Poverty and Federalism, 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 412, 569-77 (1999)
(arguing that the national government has authority over fundamental aspects of
citizenship, and egalitarian impulses upon which the country were founded include full
citizenship rights extended to the poor).
142. Zietlow, supra note 10, at 23. Zietlow further argues that the formalist
approach to due process may hurt rather than help the poor because "they serve to mask
substantive injustice .... Thus, process has become part of the problem to the extent
that it has become a means to legitimate a system that is fundamentally unfair." Id. at
26.
143. Id. at 31-32. Moreover, by focusing on fairness, procedural due process
protections may spill over to enhance substantive rights. Zietlow argues that the Court
is capable of applying and indeed has applied an "organic" approach to process, based
on "substantive communitarian notion[s] of fairness" rather than the individualist
formalist approach which it has adopted in more recent years. Id. at 51-52.
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Conclusion
Block granting of the welfare program was the first step
towards devolution of the safety net. President George W. Bush's
proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 included proposals for block
granting other low-income programs, including Medicaid and the
State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Section 8 housing
vouchers, Unemployment Insurance, Head Start, child welfare, and
job training.144 In 2005, a House Ways and Means Subcommittee
passed a version of welfare reauthorization bill, H.R. 240, which
contains a proposal to allow five states to elect a food stamp block
grant in lieu of the federal Food Stamp program.145  Thus,
devolution raises concerns-namely accountability, politics, and
discretion-that extend to a large swath of the country's social
welfare system.
Invoking procedural due process protections may address some
of these concerns. Indeed, consistent with the historical importance
of procedural protections for the poor, and with courts' continuing
recognition of the importance of preserving federal protections to
guard against local and state abuse of the poor, procedural due
process can address race discrimination in a devolved welfare
system and perhaps bridge the gap between limited federal
statutory rights and devolution of the safety net.
144. See The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/budget-fy2004/. See also, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, FY2004 Budget in Brief, at
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf (Feb. 2003). For a critique of the
block grant proposals concerning Medicaid and SCHIP, see Families USA, Slashing
Medicaid: The Hidden Effects of the President's Block-Grant Proposal, at
http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/Slash-report.pdf?doclD=961 Oast visited
May 2003). For a critique of the Section 8 block grant proposal, see Barbara Sard and
Will Fischer, Housing Voucher Grant Bills Would Jeopardize an Effective Program and Likely
Lead to Cuts in Assistance for Low-Income Families, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
at http://www.cbpp.org/5-14-03hous.pdf (May 14, 2003). For an up-to-date report on
the status of various block grant proposals, see Coalition for Human Needs, Block Grant
Proposals That Threaten Services for Families and Communities: Shifting Responsibility for
Programs Without the Resources to Pay for Them, at
http://www.chn.org/dia/organizations/chn/pdf/blockgrantgrid.pdf (October 2004).
145. Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005, H.R. 240,
109th Cong. § 602 (2005). For a critique of the Food Stamp block grant, see Stacy Dean et
al., Five-State Food Stamp Block Grant Proposal in House Welfare Bill Would Risk Serious
Harm to Low-Income Families, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, at
http://www.cbpp.org/5-13-02fs.pdf (une 5, 2003).
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